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I. INTRODUCTION
California’s coastal cities have contemplated regulating shortterm lodging units (STLU), like those offered on Airbnb. Many
cities do so to appease residents complaining of STLUs disrupting
their neighborhoods. Grievances include noise, insufficient local
parking, and disruption of community character. However, the
California Coastal Commission (the Commission) has asserted its
authority under the California Coastal Act of 1976 (the Coastal Act)
in an effort to prevent cities from regulating STLUs without first
obtaining Commission approval. The Coastal Act empowers the
Commission to protect public access to the coast, and the
Commission has designated STLUs as a vital source of that access.1
Although zoning and nuisance regulation traditionally fit within
cities’ police power, the Commission has final authority over all
“development” in the coastal zone, as delineated in the Coastal
Act.2 The Commission interprets “development” to include STLU
regulation and uses that broad definition to effectively require
cities to get approval before passing any new restrictions, thereby
giving the Commission unprecedented authority over cities’
zoning power.
The purpose of this Note is to analyze the Commission’s history
of providing public access to low-cost overnight accommodations
in the coastal zone as it relates to its current efforts to limit
municipal STLU regulations. The Commission’s broad historic
view of its authority under the Coastal Act is reflected in its
approach to limiting local regulation of STLUs. Currently, the
Commission asserts its authority over municipal STLU regulation
in two ways: (1) its review and issuance of coastal development
permits in coastal areas where the Commission has direct
permitting authority; and (2) its review and approval of Local
Coastal Programs before delegating permitting authority to cities
and counties. In both areas, the Commission must walk a line
between its legitimate review of land use decisions for their impacts
on coastal access and its impairment of local government’s common
law authority to do the same in pursuit of its own legitimate
objectives. In areas where the Commission has direct permitting
1. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 30000–30900 (West 2018).
2. Id.; see id. § 30200.
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authority, it asserts a broad interpretation of “development” that
includes local land use and nuisance regulations, especially
limitations on STLUs that only pose a potential—as opposed to
actual—change in land use.
Several cities have challenged the Commission’s practice at the
trial court level. State courts have historically upheld the
Commission’s broad interpretation of what constitutes
“development.” Federal courts, in contrast, seem less willing to
uphold the Commission’s broad definition of “development.”
Neither has struck a clear balance between the Commission’s
preemptive authority to intervene when coastal land use decisions
limit public access and cities’ traditional police power to protect
single-family residential neighborhoods. The Commission’s
current interpretation of “development” encroaches on coastal
cities’ police power and poses significant risks to public welfare.
II. BACKGROUND
Coastal Act disputes in California are usually between the
regulated (property owners) and the regulator (the Commission).
In the case of STLUs, however, the Commission and property
owners are more likely to be aligned in their support of short-term
rental of residential homes against cities and neighbors concerned
about their nuisance effects.3 Many property owners favor STLUs
because owners can convert their unused property into income
with higher rents charged for short-term use, especially during
peak seasons. The Commission asserts authority over STLUs in the
interest of providing low-cost accommodations on the coast.
Cities choose to regulate STLUs because the properties threaten
neighborhood stability, affordable housing stock, and public welfare.
A. Rise in STLU Popularity
STLUs have risen in popularity with the advent of home
sharing websites like Airbnb. Airbnb is an online platform that
connects hosts with travelers looking for overnight accommodation
around the world and offers unique advantages for both hosts

3. See Homeaway.com, Inc. v. City of Santa Monica, No. 2:16-cv-06641-ODW, 2018
WL 1281772, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2018).
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and guests.4 These competitive advantages have contributed to
Airbnb’s popularity and have drawn the regulatory attention of
coastal cities. Since its launch and subsequent success, Airbnb has
generated substantial controversy.5 However, this Note will only
address the controversies necessary to provide context for the
Commission’s resistance to STLU regulation.
Property owners or leaseholders may become hosts by listing
their spaces on Airbnb’s website with custom prices, schedules, and
guest requirements.6 Hosts can rent entire properties or individual
rooms.7 This flexibility allows hosts to generate income from
properties they already own, including those in single-family
residential neighborhoods.
Travelers connect with potential hosts by creating an Airbnb
profile and browsing available accommodations.8 Travelers can
often find cheaper and more interesting accommodations than
hotels, such as coastal beach houses.9 Across the world, options
range from cheap, single rooms in an apartment to igloos to
extravagant castles.10 Because Airbnb allows hosts to list properties
in primarily residential areas, travelers can also find more local
accommodation experiences than they find at hotels.11
Airbnb’s flexibility for hosts and attractiveness to travelers
draws investors as well. Through Airbnb’s platform, savvy
investors convert residential properties into units that “operate
year-round essentially as independent, unlicensed hotel rooms.”12
In fact, “64% of Airbnb listings in Los Angeles . . . are never

4. Alexander W. Cloonan, The New American Home: Look at the Legal Issues Surrounding
Airbnb and Short-Term Rentals, 42 U. DAYTON L. REV. 27, 31 (2017).
5. Id. at 32.
6. Hosting in 3 Steps, AIRBNB (Dec. 31, 2018), https://www.airbnb.com/host/homes.
7. Dayne Lee, How Airbnb Short-Term Rentals Exacerbate Los Angeles’s Affordable
Housing Crisis: Analysis and Policy Recommendations, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 229, 232 (2016).
8. How Do I Search for a Place to Stay?, AIRBNB (Dec. 31, 2018), https://www.
airbnb.com/help/article/252/how-do-i-search-for-a-place-to-stay.
9. This fact is hotly contested between cities and STLU hosts. Hosts claim that
extended families can rent an entire house for less than multiple hotel rooms. Cities argue
that STLUs are not inherently cheaper options and that affordability depends on the actual
price. See Anthem Sales & Mgmt., LLC v. City of San Clemente, No. SACV 18-01359CJC(JDEx), at *1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2018) (STLU in question rented for $1000 per night).
10. Cloonan, supra note 4, at 28.
11. Lee, supra note 7, at 232.
12. Id. at 234.
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occupied by their owners or leaseholders.”13 But unlike hotels,
hosts and guests often do not pay hotel occupancy taxes, potentially
making them cheaper for travelers.14
B. Cities
California cities regulate neighborhoods in the interest of
protecting public welfare by exercising its police power.15 The
concept of public welfare is broad and includes concerns of
“[p]ublic safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, [and] law
and order,” or even things that “suffocate the spirit” of city
residents or neighborhoods.16 Cities do this by regulating behavior,
for example, by passing laws that require licenses for property
management or other businesses, or adopting limitations on noise
and on-street parking. Cities can also do this through zoning
ordinances that designate certain areas of town for certain uses.
STLU regulations can fall within both categories of regulations. The
line between passing behavior laws and passing zoning ordinances
is somewhat blurry, and STLU regulations can fall within both of
these categories. It is difficult to determine what portion of this
continuum of municipal police power is preempted by the
Commission’s authority to protect coastal access.
California cities regulate general land use through a general
plan and a zoning code. A city’s general plan must include a land
use element that designates the distribution, location, and extent of
different land uses.17 Generally, a city’s more specific zoning
ordinances must be consistent with its general plan.18 A city’s
zoning ordinances are considered quasi-legislative acts and
therefore are only rejected by reviewing courts if they are
“arbitrary, capricious, or totally lacking in evidentiary support.”19

13. Id.
14. Cloonan, supra note 4, at 32.
15. CECILY TALBERT BARCLAY & MATTHEW S. GRAY, CALIFORNIA LAND USE &

PLANNING LAW 1 (2016). While traditionally associated with states, California cities enjoy a
broad police power over municipal affairs under the California Constitution. DeVita v. Cty.
of Napa, 889 P.2d 1019, 1030 (Cal. 1995).
16. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32–33 (1954).
17. CITY ATT’YS’ DEP’T & LEAGUE OF CAL. CITIES, THE CALIFORNIA MUNICIPAL LAW
HANDBOOK § 10.18 (2018).
18. Id. §§ 10.89–.90.
19. Id. § 10.92.
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Under their police power, cities also have the authority to
regulate nuisance in order to protect public welfare.20 This includes
the power to prohibit anything that obstructs the free use of
property or comfortable enjoyment of property.21 Cities seeking to
regulate STLUs may do so under this power if STLUs pose a threat
to neighbors’ comfortable enjoyment of their property. Examples of
potential STLU nuisance regulation include limiting the impacts
STLUs have on street parking, trash pickup, and community
comfort.22 Conducting business without a license also constitutes
nuisance per se and may be enjoined.23
Cities also have the authority to regulate STLUs as businesses.24
While long-term rentals (greater than thirty days) are a
constitutionally protected property right, short-term rentals (less
than thirty days) are a commercial activity.25 Commercial
regulations on STLUs range from registration requirements to
outright bans.26 As with traditional visitor-oriented uses like hotels
and bed and breakfasts, cities commonly regulate STLUs by
imposing time limits, maximum guest limits, inspections, and
limits on the total rental days per year.27
A city’s police power encompasses regulating STLUs as land
uses, nuisances, and business activities. These types of STLU
restriction seem to fit together on an overlapping continuum. A
land use ordinance may restrict specific commercial uses, like
hosting an STLU, in residential areas. A nuisance ordinance may
protect community character by prohibiting activities incidental to
the presence of STLUs, effectively prohibiting them. A business
activity regulation may restrict STLU permits to specific locations
where the community is well-suited to accommodate transient
visitors. All three categories of police power exercise allow for a de
facto prohibition on STLUs. Although different by name, each of
these categories fits into a city’s ability to regulate neighborhoods
within its boundaries.

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

1374

Id. § 9.121.
Id. § 9.122; see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 3479 (West 2018).
CITY ATT’YS’ DEP’T & LEAGUE OF CAL. CITIES, supra note 17, §§ 9.122–.123.
City of Claremont v. Kruse, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1 (Ct. App. 2009).
CITY ATT’YS’ DEP’T & LEAGUE OF CAL. CITIES, supra note 17, § 9.52B.
Id. § 9.52A.
Id. § 9.52B.
Id. § 9.52D.
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Most California cities can regulate STLUs as they see fit. Coastal
cities, however, are subject to the Commission’s preemptive
authority to protect STLUs. The Commission has chosen to do this
by expanding its traditional role of reviewing physical development
in coastal areas to reviewing cities’ nuisance and business
regulations under a broad interpretation of “development” in the
Coastal Act.
C. California Coastal Commission and the Coastal Act
In 1976, the California legislature adopted the Coastal Act,
declaring California’s coastal zone “a distinct and valuable natural
resource of vital and enduring interest.”28 It further declared that
“existing developed uses[] and future developments . . . are
essential to the economic and social well-being of the people of
this state.”29 The Commission administers the Coastal Act by
“plan[ning] and regulat[ing] the use of land and water in the coastal
zone” in coordination with coastal cities.30
The coastal zone was mapped by California’s legislature and
includes a three-mile-wide band of ocean and a variable width of
land along the entire coastline, minus San Francisco Bay and a few
other exceptions.31 The coastal zone overlaps with fifteen counties
and sixty-one cities.32 The Commission and these cities and counties
implement the Coastal Act by preparing Local Coastal Programs
(LCP) that include a land use plan, which is similar to a city’s
general plan, and an implementation plan, which is similar to a
city’s zoning code.33 A city may submit its land use plan and
implementation plan or get its land use plan approved first and
submit an implementation plan later.
Any “development” in the coastal zone cannot begin without a
coastal development permit from the Commission or from a local
government in areas where the Commission has delegated

28. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE ANN. § 30001(a) (West 2018).
29. Id. § 30001(d).
30. Our Mission, CAL. COASTAL COMM’N (Dec. 31, 2018), https://www.coastal.ca.

gov/whoweare.html.
31. Id. These exceptions are often governed by other authorities in addition to counties
and cities.
32. Id.
33. Id.

1375

005.SMITH_FIN.DOCX(DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

8/5/20 10:00 PM

2019

permitting authority through an approved LCP.34 In areas without
LCPs, applicants must seek local land use and building permit
approvals from the city and separate coastal development permits
from the Commission. In areas with approved LCPs, cities have the
ability to issue all permits as long as their issuance of coastal
development permits is consistent with the requirements of an
LCP.35 The Commission must approve any amendments to an
LCP.36 Any city development also requires a coastal development
permit from the Commission.37
According to the Commission, “[t]he Coastal Act defines
development broadly . . . to include not only typical land
development activities such as construction of buildings, but also
changes in the intensity of use of land or water, even where no
construction is involved.”38 Under this definition, examples of
“development” include discharging a fireworks display over a
river estuary and a property owner limiting historical public access
to the coast over her private property.39
The Commission evaluates LCPs for conformance with Coastal
Act policies upon submission and every five years after that.40 One
such policy is to “[m]aximize public access to and along the coast
and maximize public recreational opportunities in the coastal zone
consistent with sound resources conservation principles and
constitutionally protected rights of private property owners.”41
The Commission’s primary interaction with cities occurs upon
LCP submission and approval. During this interaction, the
Commission’s power is limited to approving or denying the LCP.42
However, the Commission has effectively expanded its power to
34. Id.
35. Local Coastal Programs, CAL. COASTAL COMM’N (Dec. 31, 2018), https://www.

coastal.ca.gov/lcps.html.
36. Local Coastal Programs: Resources for Local Governments, CAL. COASTAL COMM’N
(Dec. 31, 2018), https://www.coastal.ca.gov/rflg/.
37. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE ANN. § 30600(a) (West 2018); id. § 21066 (“person” includes a city).
38. Coastal Development: Permit Applications and Appeal Forms, CAL. COASTAL COMM’N,
coastal.ca.gov/cdp/cdp-forms.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2019).
39. Gualala Festivals Comm. v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 106 Cal. Rptr. 3d 908, 909 (Ct.
App. 2010); Surfrider Found. v. Martins Beach 1, LLC, 221 Cal. Rptr. 3d 382, 389 (Ct. App.
2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 54 (2018).
40. Our Mission, supra note 30.
41. PUB. RES. § 30001.5(c).
42. See San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 238 Cal. Rptr. 3d 671
(Ct. App. 2018).
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review city ordinances outside of the LCP process, especially STLU
regulations, by considering them development under the Coastal
Act, inasmuch as the ordinance decreases the supply of affordable
overnight accommodation in the coastal zone. The Commission
argues that STLU restrictions constitute “development” because
they change the intensity of use and access to the shoreline.43 Thus,
the Commission argues that STLU restrictions must be authorized
by a coastal development permit, issued by the Commission, and
conformed to the Coastal Act’s policy to provide affordable
overnight accommodations.44
The Commission acknowledges that STLUs pose a threat to
public welfare but “has not historically supported blanket [STLU]
bans” because such restrictions are not consistent with the Coastal
Act’s affordable accommodation policies.45 The Commission has
only approved partial STLU bans, including regulations that limit
the total number of rental units in certain areas, the types of
housing that can be converted to STLUs, the maximum STLU
occupancy, and the amount of time a given unit may be rented
during a given time period.46 The Commission has also approved
requirements for 24-hour management or emergency response, for
parking, for noise limits, for transient occupancy taxes, and for
specific signage posting important information.47
Although the Commission paints itself as willing to cooperate
with cities to impose reasonable regulations on STLUs, it is peculiar
that the Commission is involved at all. Outside of approving an
LCP, the Commission is not involved in cities’ day-to-day general
plan resolutions or zoning ordinances, let alone nuisance and
business activity regulation. However, under the guise of
overseeing “development” in the coastal zone, the Commission
now supervises traditional applications of cities’ police power.

43. Opinion Letter from Cal. Coastal Comm’n to Coastal Planning/Cmty. Dev. Dirs.
(Dec. 6, 2016) (discussing short-term and vacation rentals in the California coastal zone).
44. Id. at 1.
45. Id. at 2.
46. Id.
47. Id.

1377

005.SMITH_FIN.DOCX(DO NOT DELETE)

8/5/20 10:00 PM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2019

D. Status Quo
Under the Commission’s current view of the regulatory
scheme, a city must either amend its LCP to contemplate STLU
regulations or, since STLU regulations constitute “development,”
obtain a coastal development permit to authorize any STLU
restriction. Either way, a city must receive approval from the
Commission to regulate STLUs, and the Commission has stated
that it will only approve certain limitations to public overnight
accommodations.48 Some cities have successfully challenged the
Commission’s status quo while others have struggled to loosen the
grip on STLU regulations.49
III. HISTORY OF THE COMMISSION’S EFFORTS
TO PROVIDE OVERNIGHT ACCOMMODATIONS
Section 30213 of the Coastal Act requires that the Commission
protect, encourage, and provide “[l]ower cost visitor and
recreational facilities.”50 The Commission has tried to do this in
several ways. Categorizing city STLU restrictions as
“development” is the newest iteration in a pattern of less-thanstraightforward assertions of Coastal Act authority by the
Commission to provide low-cost overnight accommodations.
A. ZIP Code Rates
In 1981, California legislators amended § 30213 of the Coastal
Act in response to concerns that the Commission overreached its
authority in the regulation of hotel development.51
In order to increase public access to overnight accommodation,
the Commission essentially required hotels to rent some of their
units at a reduced rate to moderate income guests, all under the
auspices of reviewing “development” to ensure coastal access.52

48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.
See infra Part V.
CAL. PUB. RES. CODE ANN. § 30213 (West 2018).
David Francis Pierucci, The California Coastal Commission’s Approach to Lower
Coast Overnight Visitor-Serving Accommodations Mitigation: A Policy and Legal Analysis
11 (2015) (unpublished thesis, California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo)
(available at https://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/theses/1417).
52. Paul A. Sabatier & Daniel A. Mazmanian, CAN REGULATION WORK?: THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1972 CALIFORNIA COASTAL INITIATIVE 333 (1983).
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In one case, the Commission accepted a hotel owner’s offer to
reserve forty-five rooms during weekends at 50% of the normal rate
for guests from certain zip codes.53 In 1981, likely in response to
what they saw as an overreach by the Commission, state legislators
added a provision to § 30213 forbidding the Commission from
fixing room rates or “establish[ing] or approv[ing] any method for
the identification of low or moderate income persons for the
purpose of determining eligibility for overnight room rentals in any
such facilities.”54
B. San Diego Unified Port District
In 2015, the San Diego Unified Port District, which interacts
with the Commission on essentially the same basis as a city,
submitted a port master plan55 amendment for Commission
approval.56 The original plan contemplated a single 500-room hotel,
while the amendment allowed for three hotels to provide a
combined total of 500 rooms.57 The Commission denied the
amendment on the grounds that it did not provide lower-cost
overnight accommodations with sufficient specificity, even though
the plan generally acknowledged that developers provide their fair
share of low-cost accommodations or pay an in-lieu fee.58
Normally, under § 30714, the Commission simply approves or
denies a plan according to whether it is consistent with the policies
in the Coastal Act, and it may not make a modification as a
condition for certification, such as requiring a precise, explicit
change to the plan.59 San Diego Unified Port District took issue with
the Commission’s denial, claiming the Commission had exceeded
its jurisdiction under the Coastal Act by infringing on the port
district’s discretion to determine the specifics of the port master
plan.60 The trial court agreed, ruling in the Port’s favor.61

53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.
PUB. RES. § 30213; Pierucci, supra note 51, at 10.
The functional equivalent of an LCP.
San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 238 Cal. Rptr. 3d 671, 676
(Ct. App. 2018).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 677.
59. PUB. RES. § 30714.
60. San Diego Unified Port Dist., 238 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 675.
61. Id.
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On appeal, however, the reviewing court held that the Coastal
Act only forbids “conditionally approving” a plan and requires that
the Commission provide specific reasons for denial, such as public
access deficiencies.62 Essential to this ruling, the court rejected the
trial court’s reasoning that port districts and cities possess
analogous authority. Rather, the court explained, port districts do
not enjoy the same broad discretion to determine the precise
contents of land use and implementation plans as other local
authorities, like cities.63
Although this case diminishes a port district’s authority over
plan development, it strongly affirms a city’s authority over the
specifics of LCP policy development, and its implementation of
approved LCPs through land use and zoning.
C. City Enactments as “Development” in Context
The Commission primarily interacts with cities regarding the
availability of visitor accommodations when the Commission
reviews an LCP for conformity with the Coastal Act’s policy to
provide low-cost overnight accommodations.64 The 1981
amendment to the Coastal Act marks an attempt by legislators to
narrowly limit the specificity to which the Commission may dictate
local policies. In San Diego Unified Port District’s case, the
reviewing court sanctioned the Commission’s ability to identify
deficiencies in a development proposal and to make specific
recommendations. However, this ruling turned on the fact that the
port district was not a city.65 Thus, while courts approve of the
Commission’s authority to point out deficiencies in a plan
submitted for approval, courts also recognize that cities deserve
substantial discretion in dictating specific local policy.66 In other
words, the Coastal Act grants cities “broad land-use
implementation and policy-making jurisdiction,” while the
Commission is prohibited from determining the precise content
of an LCP.67

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

1380

Id. at 693.
Id. at 687.
See supra Section II.C.
See supra Section III.B.
Id.
San Diego Unified Port Dist., 238 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 689.
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Courts’ reluctance to allow the Commission to impair
traditional, municipal land use, business, and nuisance abatement
jurisdiction in the LCP process should apply even more to the
Commission’s interpretation of “development.” The Commission’s
requirement that cities obtain a coastal development permit for
STLU regulation jettisons the normal LCP approval and
amendment processes and allows the Commission to directly
review a city’s application of traditional police power to regulate
nuisance and business, so long as there is a potential decrease in
public access. The Commission’s permitting authority is meant to
ensure that actual coastal “development” conforms with Coastal
Act policies when there is no LCP, not to allow the Commission to
dictate how cities regulate potential uses in the coastal zone in their
own general plan and zoning code as the Commission does now.
IV. “DEVELOPMENT”
Because any development in the coastal zone requires a coastal
development permit, the definition of “development” under the
Coastal Act is essential to determining the limit of the
Commission’s regulatory power. California courts tend to agree
with the Commission’s position that “development” includes a
broad range of activities. However, courts have not yet provided
specific direction about the Commission’s inclusion of city
enactments as “development” subject to Commission review under
the Coastal Act.68 Courts should not endorse the Commission’s
broad inclusion of all city ordinances in “development” because
ordinances only represent a potential change in public access, not
actual change. STLU ordinances regulating licensing, consumer
protection, noise, parking, trash, and other nuisance prohibition
arguably have nothing to do with coastal access. Leaving
unfettered discretion to the Commission to dictate which homes in
the coastal zone should be STLUs deprives municipalities of their
traditional ability to decide which uses are compatible and to
preserve single-family, owner-occupied housing stock.

68. But see Greenfield v. Mandalay Shores Cmty. Ass’n, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d 827, 828
(Ct. App. 2018). While the appellate court held that a homeowners’ association’s STLU ban
constituted “development” under the Coastal Act, courts have yet to rule on whether
general-application city ordinances constitute “development.”
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A. “Development” Under the Coastal Act
The Coastal Act requires that the Coastal Act itself be “liberally
construed to accomplish its purposes and objectives.”69 Subject to
courts’ “independent judgment on pure questions of law,”70 “[t]he
Commission has the ultimate authority to ensure that coastal
development conforms to the policies embodied in the state’s
Coastal Act.”71 Unlike most California administrative agencies, the
Commission’s acts are even exempt from review by California’s
Office of Administrative Law.72
The Coastal Act specifically defines “development” somewhat
broadly. “Development” includes erecting any solid or material
structure, discharging or disposing dredged materials or waste,
physically grading or disrupting any material, changing the
intensity of use of land or water, construction or alteration of a
structure, or removing major vegetation other than for agricultural
purposes.73 Thus, the Commission enjoys some statutory leeway in
interpreting “development.”
B. Judicial Review of and Deference for Commission Interpretations
When interpreting statutes, California courts “ascertain the aim
and goal of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the
statute.”74 They presume the plain language of the statute governs
unless the language is unclear or allows for more than one
reasonable interpretation.75 If the statute is unclear or allows for
multiple reasonable interpretations, courts look to legislative
history, public policy, and the evils to be remedied to better
ascertain the lawmakers’ intent.76 “In such circumstances, [courts]
must select the construction that comports most closely with the
aim and goal of the Legislature to promote rather than defeat the
statute’s general purpose and avoid an interpretation that would
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

CAL. PUB. RES. CODE ANN. § 30009 (West 2018).
McAllister v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 87 Cal. Rptr. 3d 365, 372 (Ct. App. 2008).
City of Dana Point v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 158 Cal. Rptr. 3d 409, 421 (Ct. App. 2013).
Cal. Coastal Comm’n v. Office of Admin. Law, 258 Cal. Rptr. 560 (Ct. App. 1989).
CITY ATT’YS’ DEP’T & LEAGUE OF CAL. CITIES, supra note 17, § 10.329;
PUB. RES. § 30106.
74. Gualala Festivals Comm. v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 106 Cal. Rptr. 3d 908, 912
(Ct. App. 2010).
75. Id.
76. Id.
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lead to absurd and unintended consequences.”77 With respect to
interpretations of the Coastal Act, courts give the “highest priority
to environmental considerations.”78
Reviewing courts in California afford an agency’s
interpretation of its governing statute “great weight,” but reserve
final interpretive authority for the courts.79 However, “courts do
not defer to an agency’s determination when deciding whether the
agency’s action lies within the scope of authority delegated to it by
the Legislature.”80 “[T]he issue of whether an agency acted in excess
of its jurisdiction is a question of law reviewed de novo on
appeal.”81 Thus, the question of whether the Commission’s
inclusion of city enactments in “development” is proper will
ultimately be decided de novo by courts, not the Commission,
because it is a question of jurisdiction.82
C. Judicial Acceptance of a Broad Interpretation of “Development”
Although the Commission’s statutory interpretations do not
receive deference, courts have upheld the Commission’s broad
interpretation of “development” under the Coastal Act on
numerous occasions. Examples of accepted interpretations of
“development” outside those specifically listed in the Coastal Act
include lot line adjustments, conversion of a storage area into a
restaurant, conversion of a mobile home park to resident
ownership, city development of public land, and projects on federal
land within the coastal zone.83 This Part will focus on two examples,
namely the inclusion of setting off fireworks and restricting
historical public access as “development.”
The word “development” is defined by the list of examples in
the Coastal Act and not by common usage. For example, California
courts upheld the Commission’s determination that a fireworks
display constitutes “development” under the Coastal Act. Gualala
Festivals Committee, an association of businesses and property

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. (brackets and citation omitted).
Id.
Id. at 911–12 (citation omitted).
Id. at 911 (citation omitted).
Id.
See id.
CITY ATT’YS’ DEP’T & LEAGUE OF CAL. CITIES, supra note 17, § 10.330.
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owners in Gualala, sought to challenge the Commission’s
requirement that the committee obtain a coastal development
permit before discharging a fifteen-minute fireworks display over
the Gualala River Estuary.84 The court conceded that “a fireworks
display is not what is commonly regarded as a development of real
property.”85 But the court ultimately sided with the Commission,
stating that the legislature did not leave “development” to be
defined by its common usage.86 Rather, the court pointed to an
expansive list, provided by the legislature, of activities that
constitute “development” under the Coastal Act, including the
discharge of any amount of gaseous or solid waste.87 The court
reasoned that the Gualala Festivals Committee’s fireworks display
would likely result in the discharge of solid and chemical waste in
the Gualala River Estuary and therefore constituted
“development” under the Coastal Act.88
“Development” also includes changing the use of private
property in the coastal zone if the change decreases public access to
the coast. Martins Beach 1 and Martins Beach 2, two LLCs,
purchased property over which the public historically enjoyed
access to the coast for a fee during the daytime.89 The new owners
initially continued to charge beachgoers for access but eventually
closed off access completely and painted over the previous owner’s
beach access sign.90 The Surfrider Foundation, a non-profit
organization dedicated to preserving the recreational use of
California’s coast, filed a complaint alleging that the new owners
engaged in “development” without obtaining a coastal
development permit as required by the Coastal Act.91 The new
owners asserted that the property was private and that closing a
gate and painting over a sign was not “development.”92 But the
court held that “development” ought to be liberally construed and
that a significant decrease in public access to beach fits within the
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Gualala Festivals, 106 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 909.
Id. at 912.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 913.
Surfrider Found. v. Martins Beach 1, LLC, 221 Cal. Rptr. 3d 382, 388 (Ct. App.
2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 54 (2018).
90. Id. at 389.
91. Id. at 390.
92. Id. at 394.
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scope of the permitting requirement.93 The gate and the sign
impaired this access. Thus, the court held the Commission could
require a coastal development permit even for a change in private
use if that use decreases public access.
D. The Difference Between Potential and Actual Changes
Although courts and the Commission interpret “development”
broadly, they should not interpret it so broadly as to include
changes to the potential use of land by city ordinance regardless of
the physical impacts of that ordinance, especially when the focus of
that ordinance is in areas traditionally regulated under the city’s
police power. The Commission currently asserts its authority to
require cities to obtain a coastal development permit to regulate
STLUs in areas without LCPs or in areas with LCPs that do not
contemplate such regulation. The Commission’s position in this
regard is that STLU regulation “represents a change in the intensity
of use and of access to the shoreline, and thus constitutes
development.”94 However, this approach represents a broader
interpretation of the Commission’s authority, even under the cases
summarized above. Both a fireworks display and the restriction of
public travel over private property represent actual changes, while
a city ordinance represents only a theoretical change. This
distinction between actual and theoretical changes is critical
because the primary purpose of the Commission’s permitting
authority is to prohibit activities that cities otherwise allow (such as
a fireworks display), not to dictate what activities cities should or
should not allow.95
The fireworks display risked almost certain discharge of solid
waste into the Gualala River Estuary. The Coastal Act specifically
classifies the discharge of waste, no matter how minimal, as
“development.”96 Although this seems to stretch the ordinary
meaning of “development,” as the reviewing court held, it is not a
surprising interpretation under the Coastal Act’s somewhat broad
definition. However, if the issue in the Gualala case had been a city
93. Id.
94. Opinion Letter from Cal. Coastal Comm’n to Coastal Planning/Cmty. Dev. Dirs.

(Dec. 6, 2016).
95. See supra Section III.C.
96. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE ANN. § 30106 (West 2018).
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ordinance generally allowing fireworks displays over the estuary,
the Commission may not have succeeded in exercising exclusive
jurisdiction over that activity. In this hypothetical, a party wishing
to shoot fireworks under the city fireworks ordinance would still
need to obtain a coastal development permit from the Commission.
The court upheld only the Commission’s traditional authority to
withhold a permit for an activity that would cause actual discharge
of waste in the estuary, not a broader authority to prevent the
creation of a city ordinance that risks theoretical future discharge
of waste. This difference is key. In other words, the Commission
has the authority to review and issue permits for actual
development activities but not for city regulations regulating or
allowing those activities.
Similarly, the Martins Beach property owners actually limited
public access to the coast by closing the entry gate and restricting
entry. This caused an actual change in the public’s access to water
as specifically contemplated in the Coastal Act’s definition of
“development.”97 This case more closely resembles the topic of this
Note. However, STLU restriction through land use, nuisance, and
business activity regulation does not actually change the intensity
of use or access as required by the Coastal Act.98 Rather, STLU
regulation represents only a potential change to access or use. The
actual change in access occurs when the property owner changes
the property’s actual use to conform to any new STLU regulation.
While it is true that a change in a city’s approach to STLU regulation
will likely herald in a future reduction in the availability of STLUs,
this application of Coastal Act authority differs significantly from
regulating actual public access to the beach in the Martins Beach
case. The court upheld the Commission’s authority to withhold a
permit from a private property owner changing public access to the
beach, not a broader authority to prevent a city ordinance that
poses a theoretical future decrease in public access to the shore
regardless of whether it relates to actual access to the coast or
simply nuisance prevention.
The Commission’s current practice of requiring cities to obtain
coastal development permits to regulate STLUs under an expansive

97. Id.
98. Id.
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interpretation of “development” exceeds the limited authority
granted by the Coastal Act. Under the Coastal Act, the
Commission’s interaction with cities is primarily limited to quasijudicial review of proposed LCPs.99 Cities enjoy substantial
discretion when determining the contents of their LCPs, while the
Commission is intended to take a backseat role.100 Outside of the
LCP approval process, the Commission is meant to act as a stopgap
to prohibit actual “development” activities that are otherwise
allowed by cities’ zoning codes, over which the Commission has no
jurisdiction. However, the Commission’s broad interpretation of
“development” to include potential changes in use, such as those
posed by zoning ordinances, allows the Commission to directly
oversee city zoning ordinances in a way not contemplated in the
Coastal Act. With respect to city zoning ordinances, courts should
preserve cities’ independent authority to regulate city affairs in the
absence of an approved LCP and should limit the Commission’s
authority to that which is outlined in the Coastal Act—namely to
fill gaps in lax local zoning codes—by interpreting “development”
to include only actual changes in use.
E. Absurd Outgrowth
California courts have stated that they will not construe the
Coastal Act so liberally as to allow for absurd applications.101 The
Commission’s broad interpretation of “development” to include
STLU restrictions leads to absurd consequences when put in the
context of Martins Beach.
The Commission stretches the definition of “development”
when it includes STLU regulations because such regulations
potentially restrict access to overnight accommodations. If any
change in the availability of residential homes as overnight
accommodations constitutes “development,” the Commission
could require private property owners, like Martins Beach’s
owners, to obtain coastal development permits to stop renting their

99. Anthem Sales & Mgmt., LLC v. City of San Clemente, No. SACV 18-01359CJC(JDEx), at *1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2018).
100. San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 238 Cal. Rptr. 3d 671, 688
(Ct. App. 2018).
101. Gualala Festivals Comm. v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 106 Cal. Rptr. 3d 908, 912
(Ct. App. 2010).
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property as an STLU. This assertion of authority is not unthinkable
in light of Martins Beach. There, the court upheld the Commission’s
authority to curb traditional private property rights in order to
maintain public access to the coast. However, it seems absurd to
require a property owner to obtain a permit to live in her own home
instead of renting it as an STLU.
Although it is uncertain whether the Commission would ever
require a property owner to obtain a permit to occupy her own
home, the Commission does prevent cities from requiring owners
to occupy their homes—even though this would be an exercise of
the city’s traditional police power. Cities’ police power allows them
to protect neighborhood character and health by requiring owner
occupancy or restricting commercial uses, such as STLU rental. The
Commission, however, asserts that it has the authority to negate
city ordinances that restrict STLUs as “development” and to allow
unfettered commercial STLU lodging throughout the coastal zone.
Taking this assertion a step further, the Commission could
neutralize cities’ ability to prevent the complete commercialization
and ultimate deterioration of coastal neighborhood communities
through conversion of single-family homes to STLUs because the
Commission has no obligation under the Coastal Act to protect
community character or welfare. Allowing the Commission to
trigger its coastal development permitting authority to negate city
ordinances as “development” would be an immense grant of power
and would put coastal neighborhoods at risk.
V. CHALLENGES TO THE STATUS QUO
Several cities have challenged the Commission’s current
practice of overseeing STLU regulations as “development” in the
coastal zone. However, no case squarely addresses the proper
balance between city authority and Commission oversight and the
proper definition of “development.”
A. Hermosa Beach
In a recent unpublished opinion, California’s Second District
Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the City of Hermosa Beach,
whose ordinance banned STLUs in residential areas altogether but
allowed them in commercial areas. The plaintiffs, who sought to
continue renting out their properties as STLUs, argued that the
1388
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city’s ban violated the policies of the Coastal Act to provide lowcost overnight accommodations.102 The court held that the policy
sections of the Coastal Act only set standards under which an LCP
is reviewed for adequacy and that there is “no authority applying
these provisions to zoning ordinances enacted pursuant to a city’s
police powers.”103 In other words, the City reserves its traditional
regulatory powers in areas of coastal jurisdiction. The court also
held that the absence of an approved LCP did not eliminate the
City’s “ability to enact and amend zoning ordinances.”104 However,
in this case, plaintiffs had conceded at trial that zoning ordinances
did not constitute “development” under the Coastal Act.105 The
court was unpersuaded by plaintiffs’ submission of Commission
opinion documents declaring STLU bans a violation of the
Coastal Act.106
This case stands for a city’s ability to regulate STLUs in areas
lacking an approved LCP. The Commission’s preemptive authority
extends only to LCP approval and development activity
permitting. The coastal zone does not revert to anarchy in the
absence of an approved LCP; cities retain jurisdiction over local
affairs. It also stands for the fact that cities without an LCP need
only get coastal development permits for “development” in the
coastal zone, not underlying traditional zoning regulations.
However, this case is peculiar for several reasons. First, the
opinion is unpublished and therefore will not have any
precedential control over the issue of future city STLU regulation.
That being said, the opinion still signals a potential willingness
from the court to affirm cities’ authority to enact zoning ordinances,
like STLU bans, without an approved LCP or LCP amendment.
Second, the court’s ruling did not touch on the issue of city
ordinances, like STLU regulations, constituting “development”
because plaintiffs conceded that they were not. Thus, the opinion
does not give much guidance on the merits of this broad
interpretation of “development.” The fact that plaintiffs conceded
the issue may indicate that city ordinances are at least not

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Johnston v. City of Hermosa Beach, B278424, 2018 WL 458920, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *5.
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clear-cut “development.” Lastly, the court noted that the
Commission had not sought to intervene in the case at the trial or
appellate levels.107 This fact may signal that the Commission knows
that the position described in its opinion documents is untenable,
and the Commission did not want to see this case establish
precedential value as a reported appellate decision. Alternatively,
this may indicate that the real battle between cities and the
Commission over the interpretation of “development” is still yet
to come.
B. Mandalay Shores
Greenfield v. Mandalay Shores Community Ass’n reached a
contrary result. In this case, homeowners who wanted to lease out
their homes as vacation rentals sued their homeowners’ association
over the association’s resolution banning STLUs in the
community.108 The homeowners argued that the association’s STLU
ban constituted “development” because it changed the intensity of
access to single-family residential homes in the coastal zone.109
Therefore, the association needed to obtain a coastal development
permit before limiting STLUs.110 The appellate court held that the
use of homes as STLUs is a matter for cities and the Commission to
regulate, not for private actors like the association.111 The court also
upheld the trial court’s finding that “arguably the public will be
restricted in its access to the coast” and held that the STLU ban
constituted “development.”112
While the court’s interpretation of “development” does not
bode well for city ordinances that outright ban STLUs, the holding
could be narrowly construed to restrict a homeowners’
association’s ability to ban STLUs. This ruling does not touch on
cities imposing reasonable restrictions on STLUs short of an
outright ban. In fact, the court explicitly stated that cities, in concert
with the Commission, are better-suited to enact STLU regulations
107. Id.
108. Greenfield v. Mandalay Shores Cmty. Ass’n, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d 827 (Ct. App. 2018),

rev. denied (June 13, 2018).
109. Id. at 828.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 828–29.
112. Id. at 831 (citing Greenfield v. Mandalay Shores Cmty. Ass’n, No. 56-201600485246-CU-MC-VTA (Aug. 12, 2016).

1390

005.SMITH_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1369

8/5/20 10:00 PM

California Coastal Commission and Overnight Accommodations

or bans.113 However, the court did not specifically discuss the
proper interplay between the Commission and cities in regulating
STLUs or whether municipal police powers allow locational limits
on STLUs.
C. Homeaway and Santa Monica
In Homeaway.com, Inc. v. City of Santa Monica, Homeaway, a
service similar to Airbnb, challenged a Santa Monica city ordinance
requiring that hosts be present for the duration of their guests’ stay,
and that Homeaway not book a rental unit that is not on
Santa Monica’s STLU registry.114 Homeaway procedurally and
substantively challenged the ordinance on the grounds that it
“restrains coastal access” without the authority of a coastal
development permit.115 Santa Monica defended its ordinance,
citing STLUs’ threat to the supply of affordable housing and the
character of its neighborhoods.116 Homeaway argued that Santa
Monica’s land use plan, as approved by the Commission under the
Coastal Act, did not contemplate limits on STLUs. Therefore,
enacting an ordinance that limits STLUs requires either a land use
plan amendment that has been reviewed by the Commission, or a
coastal development permit for “development,” also reviewed by
the Commission.117
While not ruling on the land use plan amendment issue, the
U.S. District Court held that Homeaway had not sufficiently
convinced the court that “development” includes “every possible
change in the law that might result in a change to land use” to
justify an injunction.118 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently
affirmed the decision without reaching the merits of Homeaway’s
claims. Because Homeaway was filing for an injunction against
Santa Monica and primarily relied on opinion documents from the
Commission, the briefing and ruling are not specific enough to
definitively put the issue of STLU regulation to rest.

113. Id.
114. Homeaway.com, Inc. v. City of Santa Monica, No. 2:16-cv-06641-ODW, 2018 WL

1281772, at *1–2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2018).
115. Id. at *4.
116. Id. at *2.
117. Id. at *4
118. Id.
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This case indicates that federal district courts may be skeptical
of the Commission’s position that all STLU regulations constitute
“development” under the Coastal Act. This case also directly
conflicts with the Mandalay Shores court’s position on the correct
interpretation of “development.” One way to reconcile the rulings
is that the regulation at issue in Mandalay Shores was an outright
ban posing actual changes in use, whereas Santa Monica
only imposed restrictions posing a theoretical change in
access, depending on whether long- or short-term occupancy
affected access.
D. San Clemente
In July 2018, a property owner challenged San Clemente’s STLU
regulations, arguing that the regulations violated the Coastal Act.119
The ordinances limited STLUs to certain zones within the city that
are proximate to commercial facilities and public transportation.120
The Commission had not approved the specific regulations.
Plaintiffs argued that the ordinances constituted “development”
without a coastal development permit and sought an injunction to
block their enforcement.121 Dismissing the application for relief, the
court held that the Commission’s function with respect to cities is
limited by the Coastal Act to quasi-judicial review of LCPs and
issuing coastal development permits until an LCP is approved.122
However, the Coastal Act does not preempt cities’ constitutional
police power absent a clear conflict.123 The court held that a change
in local regulations governing the potential use of land does not
constitute “development” under the Coastal Act.124
This case is a district court ruling and a review of likelihood of
outcomes in a pre-trial motion for an injunction and is therefore not
precedentially binding. However, it provides another example of
courts’ unwillingness to consider any and all local regulations as
“development” under the Coastal Act and thus preempted by

119. Anthem Sales & Mgmt., LLC v. City of San Clemente, No. SACV 18-01359CJC(JDEx), at *1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2018).
120. Id. at *3.
121. Id. at *6.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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Commission authority. This case also directly conflicts with the
interpretation of “development” in Mandalay Shores. However,
again, San Clemente’s ordinances did not outright ban STLUs, and
the authority issuing the restriction was a city, not a private entity.
The source of authority is especially important in light of the court’s
statement that the Coastal Act does not preempt cities’ police
power absent clear conflict, whereas homeowners’ associations do
not enjoy such restricted oversight from the Commission.
E. Case Consolidation
Although controlling precedent, Mandalay Shores seems to be an
easily distinguishable outlier from the Santa Monica and San
Clemente cases. First, the court in Mandalay Shores dealt with an
STLU ban under authority derived from private ownership. This
more closely resembles Martins Beach in which a private owner
restricted access through their own private property. In contrast,
Santa Monica and San Clemente’s STLU restrictions were enacted
under traditional city police power. Second, neither Santa Monica
nor San Clemente’s restrictions constituted outright STLU bans. In
contrast, the Mandalay Shores homeowners’ association outright
banned STLUs in their community. Third, while the court in
Mandalay Shores readily accepted the inclusion of homeowners’
association STLU bans in their interpretation of “development”
under the Coastal Act, courts reviewing city STLU restrictions
refused to do so. This could indicate a willingness on the courts’
part to balance the Commission’s authority to preserve coastal
access against cities’ traditional authority to regulate land use, land
use adjacencies, and the general public welfare through business
regulations and use regulations.
The court in Mandalay Shores took an aggressive stance on the
interpretation of development under the Coastal Act. Not only
does this lead to absurd consequences as described above, but it
reduces cities’ traditional police authority to combat threats to
public welfare.
Mandalay Shores, Martins Beach, and the Commission’s inclusion
of city ordinances in “development” represent a troubling trend.
All three exemplify the Commission’s assumed authority to
prevent people from doing nothing with their land, or in other
words, its assumed authority to require that people allow public
1393
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access to their land. Although the statutory definition of
“development” is broad, it should not be so broad as to give the
Commission near general police power over the coastal zone, either
by directly prohibiting property owners’ actions or tailoring city
ordinances through the coastal development permitting process.
This is a stark departure from the backseat role envisioned in
Hermosa Beach, in which the Commission’s preemptive authority
over city affairs is limited to LCP approval and development
permitting, not full police power.
VI. STLU EXTERNALITIES
Courts have yet to rule definitively on whether local STLU
regulations constitute “development” under the Coastal Act.
However, courts should eliminate this legal ambiguity in favor of
acknowledging some use of city police power to allow cities to
address significant threats to public welfare posed by STLUs.
STLUs pose a threat to the supply of affordable housing, disrupt
community character, and generate nuisance complaints.
A. STLUs Threaten Public Welfare
STLUs pose a variety of threats to public welfare. STLUs
threaten the supply of affordable housing, threaten community
character, and lead to neighbor nuisance complaints. These threats
to public welfare must be stopped by STLU regulation.
STLUs threaten cities’ ability to provide affordable housing.
Each home converted to an STLU is essentially removed from the
market and added to cities’ hotel supply.125 This not only decreases
the housing supply in coastal communities but can also lead to rent
increases and pressure on owners occupying their own homes to
convert them to STLU uses.126 In San Francisco, one quarter of
vacant homes in 2015 were filled by short-term renters, rather than
left available as affordable housing to potential buyers or
long-term renters.127
The housing market and development constraints in already
crowded areas of the coastal zone provide no ready safety valves

125. Lee, supra note 7, at 230.
126. Id.
127. Cloonan, supra note 4, at 46.
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to adequately offset these quick market changes eliminating
long-term housing availability.128
So long as a property owner or leaseholder can rent out a room on
Airbnb for cheaper than the price of a hotel room, while earning
a substantial premium over the residential market . . . there is
an overpowering incentive to list each unit in a building
on Airbnb . . . . This . . . spurs displacement, gentrification,
and segregation.129

The only real way to curb the effects of this overpowering
market incentive is to offset it by regulations limiting the
conversion of long-term housing to short-term vacation rentals.130
STLUs also pose a threat to community character. While the
actual nature of a community’s character is debatable, California’s
Sixth District Court of Appeals held that the “residential character”
of a community is threatened when a significant amount of the
homes are converted to STLU use.131 Such primarily transient uses
threaten the neighborhood’s stability:
Short-term tenants have little interest in public agencies or in the
welfare of the citizenry. They do not participate in local
government, coach little league, or join the hospital guild. They
do not lead a scout troop, volunteer at the library, or keep an eye
on an elderly neighbor. Literally, they are here today and gone
tomorrow—without engaging in the sort of activities that weld
and strengthen a community.132

While it is difficult to differentiate the potential effects
threatened by STLU guests (under thirty days) from thirty-one-day
renters (a constitutionally protected use of property), cities
regulating STLUs have assumed that neighborhood stability
and owner investment are linked to neighbor-to-neighbor
accountability, pride of ownership, and related public
welfare considerations.133

128.
129.
130.
131.

Lee, supra note 7, at 235.
Id. at 230.
Cloonan, supra note 4, at 47.
Ewing v. City of Carmel-by-the-Sea, 286 Cal. Rptr. 382, 388 (Ct. App. 1991). In this
case, the court loosely held that twelve percent of homes rented as STLUs was a significant
enough amount to threaten the character of the community.
132. Id.
133. Cloonan, supra note 4, at 45.
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STLU popularity often leads to a variety of neighbor
complaints. Permanent residents see STLUs in their neighborhoods
as sources of extraordinary noise, trash, and crime.134 Others
complain of scarce parking being taken up by travelers and
party-goers.135 More specific complaints include “dealing with
loose dogs on their lawn, seeing people littering and hearing
drunken fights in the early morning hours.”136 Cities even complain
that increased commercial activity in residential areas from STLUs
strains local police, fire, and medical emergency resources.137
STLU hosts maintain that their guests are peaceful and neat and
that transients’ impacts on neighborhoods are indistinguishable
from the impacts of long-term residents.138 Others argue that STLU
guests do not pose any increased nuisance threat compared to
everyday bad neighbors. Both produce noise, trash, crime, parked
cars, dogs, and fights.139 However, STLU guests differ in that they
do not suffer any kind of reputational sanctions for upsetting
neighborhood residents. Everyday bad neighbors, on the other
hand, must face their neighbors at some point and account for their
behavior. STLU guests can just leave at week’s end.
B. Threat Abatement
Cities are well-suited and empowered to deal with the dynamic
threats to public welfare posed by STLUs. Under their police
power, cities have broad constitutional authority to address STLUs’
threat to public welfare by regulating behaviors such as noise and
parking through nuisance regulations or by setting locational
criteria that sites uses where they are most compatible. By contrast,
the Commission has one mission only: to hold the California coast

134. Id. at 43.
135. Valerie Osier, Potential Short-Term Rental Regulations Worry Long Beach Hosts, LONG

BEACH POST (July 21, 2018), https://lbpost.com/news/city/potential-short-term-rentalregulations-worry-long-beach-hosts/.
136. Cloonan, supra note 4, at 43 (quoting Amanda May Metzger, Residents Make
Arguments on Short-Term Rentals, POSTSTAR (Aug. 20, 2014), http://poststar.com/news/
local/residents-make-arguments-on-short-term-rentals/article_2298004a-27ed-11e4-aa330019bb2963f4.html).
137. Id.
138. Phil Diehl, Coastal Commission Tells Del Mar to Expand Short-Term Rentals, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (June 17, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/
communities/north-county/sd-no-short-rentals-20180614-story.html.
139. Id.
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in public trust by using the Coastal Act and its policies to provide
greater physical access, to limit development impairing that access,
and to expand visitor accommodations wherever possible. The
Coastal Act only obligates the Commission to consider STLU
regulations’ effects on public access, not the general public welfare.
Cities address STLUs’ threat to the supply of affordable
housing by imposing durational limits. A durational limit may take
the form of a fixed number of days per year a host can rent out their
home.140 This type of regulation addresses the problem of investors
purchasing property solely to convert it to year-round STLU use by
requiring at least some owner occupation during the course of the
year, even when that occupation is less profitable.141 This regulation
also incentivizes property owners to occupy their properties for the
rest of the year, rather than leaving them vacant in the off-season.
Although this type of limitation might decrease the amount of
available STLUs during certain seasons, it would not actually
decrease affordable accommodations if the STLUs would otherwise
normally be left vacant. Durational limits can also protect
community character because they force STLU owners to occupy
their homes for part of the year and reduces the amount of
transient traffic.
Cities can address nuisance concerns by imposing a minimumlength stay.142 For example, a three-day minimum stay requirement
essentially forces guests to stay for an entire weekend and
diminishes the “weekday rentals that likely annoy permanent
residents.”143 Although this type of limitation could theoretically
decrease public access to overnight accommodations for fewer than
three days, it would not likely decrease the gross total amount of
available STLUs.
Occupancy limitations can serve to limit the nuisance impact of
STLU guests and protect community character. Occupancy limits
dictate the maximum amount of people who can stay at a given
STLU or even the amount of people allowed to be present at an
STLU at the same time.144 These types of limits prevent the raucous

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Cloonan, supra note 4, at 47–48.
Id. at 48.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 50.
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parties or spring break getaways that bother neighbors.145 Other
occupancy limits may require a host to be present on an STLU
property during guests’ rental period.146 However, STLU guests
seem to prefer rentals of the entire residence, without a host
present.147 Therefore, this type of regulation would likely result in
a decrease in STLU traffic.
City location limitations can prevent STLUs’ adverse effects on
primarily residential neighborhoods’ community character.
Location limitations can function as a part of normal zoning
ordinances or fit as a part of a permitting process.148 This type of
regulation prevents STLU impacts on neighbors by limiting STLU
use to areas that can accommodate visitors. It can also benefit
consumers by giving them better access to transportation
and restaurants.
While cities have the power to address STLUs’ threat to public
welfare in a variety of ways, the Commission is only obligated to
provide public access.149 The Commission has a statutory mandate
and authority only to ensure that the Coastal Act’s policies are
carried out.150 The Commission has no obligation in the current
regulatory scheme to consider STLU effects on the affordable
housing supply, nuisance, and threats to community character.
These issues are best left to local communities to regulate with their
concurrent police power jurisdiction.
VII. CONCLUSION
While the proper balance between the Commission’s authority
to preempt city STLU restrictions and cities’ police power remains
unclear, public welfare considerations fall through the cracks of the
current regulatory scheme. Although courts have historically
interpreted “development” broadly, an interpretation that includes

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 51.
CAL. PUB. RES. CODE ANN. § 30001.5(c) (West 2018). This is an oversimplification.
The Coastal Act sets out many policies. However, the Commission asserts its authority
to permit city STLU restrictions under the Coastal Act’s policy to provide
overnight accommodations.
150. San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 238 Cal. Rptr. 3d 671,
692–94 (Ct. App. 2018).
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normal city regulations of nuisance and business, as the
Commission suggests, would severely hinder cities’ ability to
respond to significant threats to public welfare.
The Commission’s current prioritization of public access
through STLUs over all else poses serious consequences for cities.
Even if “development” is eventually construed so broadly as to
include everyday city STLU limitations, a Coastal Act amendment
or new state regulation could correct this imbalance by requiring
the Commission to consider important city objectives in addition to
the Coastal Act’s policy of increasing overnight accommodations
through STLUs. Such a change would prevent the Commission
from increasing public access at the public’s expense.
Taylor Smith*
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